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CONTRACTS - RESTRAINT ON EMPLOYEE'S RIGHT TO ENTER COMPETING 
BUSINESS-PARTIAL ENFORCEMENT OF RESTRAINT INDIVISIBLE BY ITS OWN 
TERMs-A provision in defendant's employment contract stated that if he 
ceased to be employed by plaintiff for any reason, he would not "for a period 
of ten years thereafter" enter into a competing business. The trial court 
denied plaintiff's request for injunctive relief against defendant's violation 
of this restriction. On appeal, held, reversed, , one justice dissenting. An 
employer can obtain partial enforcement for a reasonable time of an em-
ployee's agreement not to enter into a competing business, even though the 
restraint as agreed upon by the parties is unreasonable and is not made 
divisible by its own terms. Fullerton Lumber Co. v. Torborg; (Wis. 1955) 
70 N.W. (2d) 585. 
In determining whether partial enforcement will be given to a restraint 
which is unreasonable in its entirety,1 the majority of courts distinguish 
between restraints which are "divisible" and those which are not. The 
common practice is to reduce restraints of the former type to reasonable 
proportions by striking out the excessive part.2 This distinction is based 
on the premise that giving partial effect to an "indivisible" restraint would 
be enforcing an agreement the parties did not make.3 Howevei:, if this 
argument implies that the parties' agreement is being carried out by partial 
enforcement of a "divisible" restraint, then the distinction should be aban-
doned. When parties state, for example, that an employee shall not enter 
into a competing enterprise within "the states of California, Oregon, and 
15 "In the midst of petitioner's testimony the proceedings abruptly changed. The 
investigation became a 'trial,' the grand jury became a judge ••• .'' In re Oliver, note 6 
supra, at 272. 
16 No other case involving this same "accusatorial" interest in a judge was cited as 
precedent by petitioners or found by the writer. But to the effect that a judge's financial 
interest in securing conviction violates due process, see Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 
47 S.Ct. 437 (1927). 
1 The following analysis applies to restraints as to area as well as duration. Although 
there are different considerations as to the "reasonableness" of the restraints when included 
in sale of a business as opposed to employment agreements, the considerations as to partial 
enforcement are identical. 6 CORBIN, CoNTRAcrs §1394 (1951). 
2 See 2 CoNTRAcrs REsrATEMENT §518 (1932); 5 WILLISTON, C0NTRAGrS §1659 (1937), 
for a statement of the rule and a citation "of cases. The principal case, however, reflects 
a growing disagreement with this rule among recent decisions. See, e.g., John Roane, Inc. 
v. Tweed, (DeL 1952) 89 A. (2d) 548; Burroughs Adding Machine Co. v. Chollar, (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1935) 79 S.W. (2d) 344; Thomas v. Parker, 327 Mass. 339, 98 N.E. (2d) 640 
(1951). But see 15 BOST. UNIV. L. REv. 834 (1935). 
a Donahue v. Permacel Tape Corp., (Ind. 1955) 127 N.E. (2d) 235. It is interesting 
to contrast the traditional rationale employed by the Indiana court with that of the prin-
cipal case. The two decisions reach opposite results on very similar facts. 
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Washington during 1956, 1957, and 1958" they do not intend a different 
result than if they had said "the states on the Pacific Coast from 1956 
through 1958."4 It is also apparent that such a distinction is formalistic 
and offers an undue reward to the artful employer who drafts a divisible 
restraint. If the courts reject "divisibility" as a basis for determining 
whether partial enforcement should or should not be given; they still are 
confronted with the problem of determining what a proper basis should be. 
It is possible that such a basis may be found in the accepted principle of 
contract law that the courts should carry out the expressed intent of the 
parties. But what intent as to partial enforcement did the parties make 
explicit? It is arguable that the parties intended no partial enforcement, 
for by agreeing upon the restraint incorporated in the contract they re-
jected any other. On the other hand, it may be contended that they did 
intend partial enforcement, since when they agreed to a restraint of a given 
scope they desired. to impose any restriction of lesser extent should the full 
restriction prove unenforceable. Both of these conclusions suffer from the 
same objection; there is usually no expression of either intent and the con-
clusions arise only as an inference from what the parties actually stated. 
There are rational bases for both inferences, but the "inferred intent of 
the parties," which many courts purport to find, is often predetermined by 
the result desired.5 The soundest conclusion is an admission that the parties 
did not express any intent as to partial enforcement and that they probably 
did not even consider the possibility that their agreement would not be 
fully enforced. 
Accepting this conclusion, the courts may still adopt the position that 
they can enforce only a restraint agreed to by the parties. Such a view is 
founded either upon the assumption that the courts cannot impose narrower 
obligations than those to which the parties have expressly agreed, or upon 
the assumption that the most equitable result will always be reached by 
enforcing only the agreed upon obligations. The first assumption is clearly 
erroneous since there are instances where the courts will require a perform-
ance only approximating the actual agreement.6 The second assumption is 
4 5 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcrs §1660 (1937). For an example of the importance ot 
phraseology, compare Pancake Realty Co. v. Harber, 137 W. Va. 605, 73 S.E. (2d) 438 
(1952), with Hommel Co .. v. Fink, 115 W. Va. 686, 177 S.E. 619 (1934). Objection should 
also be made to the tortuous reasoning of those courts which rephrase ·a restraint in-
divisible by its own terms into an equivalent divisible agreement in order to apply the 
"divisibility test." Fleckenstein Bros. Co. v. Fleckenstein, 76 N.J.L. 613, 71 A. 265 (1908). 
See 32 ORE. L. REv. 260 (1953). In Schmid! v. Central Laundry and Supply Co., (Sup. 
Ct. 1939) 13 N.Y.S. (2d) 817, the court struck down the indivisible restraint and then 
"implied" a restraint reasonable in scope. 
5 Compare Ceresia v. Mitchell, (Ky. 1951) 242 S.W. (2d) 359, with Beit v. Beit, 135 
Conn. 195, 63 A. (2d) 161 (1948). 
6 E.g., cases of partial enforcement of agreements to convey land made by a husband 
when the wife refuses to join in the conveyance [Feldman v. Lisansky, 239 N.Y. 81, 145 
N.E. 746 (1924)] or made by a vendor when the tract actually contains less acreage than 
agreed upon [Binder v. Hejhal, 347 III. 11, 178 N.E. 901 (1931)]. See, generally, 2 CoN· 
TRACIS R.EsrATEMENT §365 (1932). 
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doubtful. The employer usually has a legitimate claim to a reasonable 
restraint, and one may question whether he is not being penalized by a 
complete denial of its enforcement. 7 The employee, on the other hand, is 
prejudiced only by the unreasonable part of an excessive restraint, and the 
court can adequately protect him without relieving him of all obligations 
under his agreement.8 Objection has been made to partial enforcement on 
the grounds that the employer may knowingly impose a broad restraint 
and then let the courts cut it down to reasonable proportions.9 But if such 
is the case, the solution is to deny relief in the particular instance.10 In the 
ordinary case, the courts should impose a restraint which will be reasonable 
in scope and ignore any reference to a fictional "intent of the parties." 
William R. Jentes, S.Ed. 
7 The facts of the principal case are particularly illustrative of a situation where the 
employee is personally responsible for building up and maintaining the employer's busi-
ness and where his departure and attendant competition have a material and adverse 
effect on that business. Williston and Corbin also note that while the restraint is viewed 
as socially and economically undesirable there is nothing criminal in its formation. 
Williston and Corbin, "On the Doctrine of Beit v. Beit," 23 CONN. B. J. 40 (1949). 
Generally, ·the employer is most interested in injunctive relief. But even a damage 
remedy is confronted with difficulties of proof and the possibility that the entire restraint 
will be deemed "void." But see Hartman v. Everett, 158 Okla. 29, 12 P. (2d) 543 (1932). 
For a discussion of the possibilities of obtaining both types of relief, see 5 CORBIN, CoN-
TRAC'rS §1071 (1951). 
s Accord, Hill v. Central West Public Service Co., (5th Cir. 1930) 37 F. (2d) 451. 
9 For an excellent expression of this view, see Mason v. Provident Clothing and Supply 
Co., [1913] A.C. 724 at 745; 45 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 751 (1932). 
10 Principal case at 592; 26 N.C. L. R.Ev. 402 (1948). 
